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ENVIRONMENTAL POLI-
tics in Latin America are at 
a turning point. Social and 
economic transformations 
in the last two decades have 
resulted in a fundamental 
shift in the way the demo-
cratic process in general, 
and environmental politics 
and policies specifically, play 
out in the region. While still 
in an embryonic stage, the 
emerging environmental politics are those in which groups heretofore 
absent in the environmental debate are now taking relevant actions, 
establishing agendas, and forcing new allocations of the benefits and 
costs associated with resource use at all levels of society. The last decade 
witnessed unprecedented mobilizations of rural and indigenous com-
munities and resource-rich towns seeking to reverse the environmental 
aggression of the last century. The fundamental political transformation 
is expressed as greater environmental governance, the strengthening 
of state environmental agencies, and, above all, increasing stakeholder 
participation in the making of environmental policies. New pressures 
for action develop, among other factors, by changes in the conditions 
of access and control of the region’s natural resources, developments 
in property rights, including liability measures, at various levels, from 
the state to the household, rapid urbanization, and improved living 
standards. Increased awareness of the potential value of environmental 
resources and an emerging concern for a quality of life associated with 
the conditions in which Latin American societies live are creating a new 
political process in which more diverse and broad social representa-
tions are coming to light.
Until the end of the twentieth century, Latin America’s environmen-
tal agenda was, at the state level, subordinated to the more pressing 
issues of the day: economic growth and security. For the most part, the 
environmental dimension was absent in the debate about economic and 
social development and very rarely appeared in the form of electoral 
agendas. In part as a reflection of this prioritization, few governments 
used economic and policy tools for improving the allocation efficiency 
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are now being paid for the environmental 
services their lands provide.
Perhaps the most telling development is 
that public environmental policy is increas-
ingly responsive to popular opinion. More 
and more elected officials are using environ-
mental protection to underpin their political 
campaigns. In this way, the social mobilization 
of the early twenty-first century is framing 
new environmental policy. To some extent, 
the strength of this new policy is anchored 
in the linking of social and environmental 
agendas. Environmentally minded politicians 
in Argentina’s La Rioja province have banned 
open-air mining using outdated technologies 
that would not be acceptable in developed 
countries and, under pressure from local citi-
zen groups, have put this issue to a vote in a 
local referendum. Moreover, La Rioja’s pro-
cess is followed closely in other Argentinian 
provinces since it is testing new ground in this 
emerging environmental democracy. Activ-
ism is widespread in Argentina, and for many 
reasons: contamination from paper mills on 
the border with Uruguay, polluting tannery 
mills and gold mines, and contaminated lakes. 
Similar demands by civil society have occurred 
in mining towns in Peru and Ecuador. The 
nonelites (indigenous groups, rural commu-
nities) have adopted the environment, along 
with other long-standing banners of nonelite 
political activism. Indigenous communities in 
Peru and Ecuador are holding national and 
international resource-intensive companies, 
in oil and mining, liable for the environmen-
tal impact of their actions over the past four 
decades.
of national environmental resources. Environ-
mental policies and regulations were usually 
ignored, and environmental agencies granted 
limited and often ineffectual powers. At the 
level of the civil society, the environmental 
agenda was almost exclusively in the hands of 
elites. One could even say that the environmen-
tal agenda was part of a structural adaptation, 
designed to create jobs for a rapidly growing 
group of educated, environmentally friendly 
technocrats, who found employment and a 
reason to exist in the thousands of environmen-
tal nonprofit organizations that mushroomed 
everywhere in Latin America. They took advan-
tage of a growing flow of funds from the north 
to establish protected areas, implement media 
campaigns, and, in general, to put forth an 
environmental agenda with minimal confron-
tation to the development paradigms of the 
day. Development was aggressive toward the 
region’s ecosystems and people. Governments 
saw in undeveloped areas, especially those 
still beyond the agricultural frontier, options 
to reduce social pressures in the more con-
tested traditional agricultural regions. Frontier 
colonization schemes were common after the 
1960s, resulting in rapid deforestation, deserti-
fication, and soil erosion. Protected areas were 
off-limits only when they did not contain valu-
able resources. Rivers were free conduits of 
industrial and urban waste. From Buenos 
Aires’s Riachuelo to Quito’s Machángara, urban 
metropolises saw their rivers and lakes criti-
cally polluted. Millions of emissions-spewing 
cars contaminated the air of the region’s cities, 
forcing driving restrictions in the worst cases, 
such as Mexico City and Bogotá. Urban and 
rural communities, which may or may not have 
perceived the environmental problems around 
them, had neither the political, institutional, or 
economic resources nor the luxury to actively 
search for solutions or to be concerned with 
their surroundings, as long as these did not 
affect the means to future food and shelter. 
In some cases, the urban working class even 
opposed stricter environmental regulations 
because they saw in them a threat to their 
employment and their access to a consumer 
society. 
Policy Progress in the 1990s
The last decade of the twentieth century was 
a period when the fundamentals for a new 
environmental era began to be constructed. 
New constitutions in Colombia and Ecuador 
codified the rights of indigenous peoples to 
their ancestral lands. Brazil instituted one 
of the most progressive forest policies in the 
world. The 1991 Colombian constitution 
redefined the country as multiethnic and plu-
ricultural. It was the basis for the passage of 
Law 70 in 1993 and Law 388 in 1997. Law 
70 recognized the collective land rights of 
rural Afro-Colombian communities with tra-
ditional production practices and established 
mechanisms to protect their territories and 
cultural identity. Grass-roots organizations 
also developed at a rapid pace and found in 
the environment a rallying point for many 
of the political and technical components of 
their agendas. Indigenous organizations in 
particular have grown stronger and can now 
hold states and multinational corporations 
accountable for their actions in their terri-
tories. States were unable, or unwilling, to 
breach the conditions that even small commu-
nities began to impose. In Ecuador, the small 
but powerful Kichwa community of Sarayacu 
has resisted all attempts by the oil industry to 
penetrate its territory. Cities in Latin America 
are finding that the provision of key resources 
and ecological services, from water to solid 
waste disposal, previously clearly defined as 
public goods, are now controlled and restricted 
by rural communities. Because the sustainable 
management of these resources or the condi-
tions that make them available, often referred 
to as environmental services, impose restric-
tions on they way they are managed by their 
owners, urban users have found it necessary 
to compensate them to secure access to what 
they need. Farmers from Costa Rica to Ecuador 
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The Changing Frontier
The expansion of agricultural frontiers, which 
were associated with extensive deforestation 
and habitat degradation in the tropical lowland 
and highland regions, also reached a turning 
point. In the 1960s, expansion was based on a 
de facto open frontier, where poor immigrant 
farmers, and later large, capital intensive agro-
industries, could occupy and expand the area 
farmed, often by cattle ranching in the case of 
small farmers, and cattle and industrial crops 
(soy, palm oil) for larger scale operations. 
Today, the open frontier is full. The increased 
establishment of clear property rights on the 
part of indigenous communities and other 
long-standing communities has, for all practi-
cal purposes, closed the frontier. In the past, 
frontier expansion in the Amazon, Choco, 
and Central American tropical forests came 
from the outside, as millions of poor farmers 
colonized these areas using newly constructed 
roads that decreased transportation costs, 
attracted by free land and expanding local 
markets in the form of towns and cities. Today, 
much of the remaining forest is in the hands 
of either the state, in the form of national pro-
tected areas, or of indigenous communities, as 
large territorial properties. While most of the 
time these lands are held communally, as a 
whole they constitute private property, where 
indigenous communities are able to exclude 
other users, farmers, and industries (such as 
the oil industry). In the Ecuadorian Amazon, 
61 percent of the remaining forest is inside 
indigenous territories and 19 percent more 
inside protected areas. Similar trends have 
been reported in Brazil, Peru, and Colombia. 
Recent studies show that forest clearing slows 
down significantly where these rights have 
been established. The consolidation of national 
protected area systems also has played a key 
role in limiting deforestation. In the past four 
years alone, the Brazilian government has 
set aside 20 million hectares of Amazonian 
forest for protection, for a total of some 110 
million hectares of protected forest—now the 
largest protected area system in the world. 
To protect isolated indigenous communities, 
Ecuador designated a 1 million hectare area as 
an “untouchable zone,” where oil and logging 
are prohibited. Environmental organizations 
have successfully limited operations of oil 
companies with rights to important oil fields 
within this area. In a move that would have 
been unlikely a decade ago, the Ecuadorian 
power and economic resources, working 
conditions, technology, and patterns of con-
sumption have given rise to a whole new set of 
“environmentally active actors,” who are not 
only demanding a new development agenda, 
but also creating economic value out of the 
region’s natural resources, such as biodiversity, 
through increased domestic tourism, formerly 
an exclusively international phenomenon, 
and green markets. Governments have began 
taking account of some, not yet many, envi-
ronmental costs associated with resource use. 
This is often under pressure, to be sure, but 
twenty years ago no amount of pressure would 
have had this effect. States have begun to give 
more regulatory power to their environmen-
tal agencies and to work more closely with 
their judiciary in environmental matters. Even 
suspicion of environmental risk may now be 
enough to trigger action. The Brazilian Envi-
ronmental Agency (IBAMA) closed a large 
soy processing plant and port in the Amazon 
because it did not have the required environ-
mental impact assessment, and the Ecuadorian 
Ministry of the Environment recently stopped 
new road construction by oil companies in the 
Yasuni National Park. Yet the process is still 
full of contradictions. While much of what is 
happening is grounded in this strengthening 
of property rights and corporate liability, there 
has been strong opposition to other types of 
privatization, most notably, of water. Indig-
enous and rural communities have become 
active opponents of plans to create markets 
for environmental services because of the fear 
that their access to water, erosion control, and 
other environmental commodities and services 
will be privatized and under corporate control. 
Likewise, indigenous organizations are not 
always interested in increased government 
control and, in particular, the designation 
of areas inside their territories as protected. 
Much remains to be done. According to FAO’s 
State of the World’s Forest 2007 Report, Latin 
America and the Caribbean lost 0.5 percent 
of its forest area between 2000 and 2005, 20 
percent faster than in the previous five years. 
Most urban waterways continue to be polluted 
and the air contaminated. However, the seed 
has been planted and the transformation is 
under way.
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government did not cookie-cut this area to 
allow development of these fields. Further-
more, in response to intense pressure from 
environmentalists and indigenous groups, 
in an unprecedented, if unlikely, experi-
ment, the Ecuadorian government is seeking 
environmentally sensitive alternatives to the 
development of other large oil fields by asking 
the international community to compensate 
for the lost revenues of not taking environ-
mentally damaging actions. Specifically, it is 
asking for half the revenues forfeited if oil 
extraction in a sensitive pristine Amazon rain-
forest is not carried out—$350 million. The 
success of such a strategy is unlikely because it 
would be difficult for even the largest donors 
to release such sums for biodiversity protec-
tion. On the other hand, the emerging carbon 
markets are already much larger, reaching 
tens of billions of dollars annually and glob-
ally. This option seems more plausible since 
the nondevelopment of these oil fields would 
prevent the release of almost half a billion 
tons of carbon.
But it is not only the institutional changes 
that directly affect attitudes toward public 
resources. Independent of environmental 
politics, the politics of development are also 
forcing new conditions that have an impor-
tant, if unintended, environmental outcome. 
A forest transition, or the moment when forest 
growth overcomes forest clearing, is evident 
in many locales, so many in some cases that 
they have a clear national impact. In El Sal-
vador, for example, forest cover has increased 
as a result of the contraction of agricultural 
land. Prof. Susanna Hecht of UCLA attributes 
this to the decline of the relative value of 
agricultural work, the growth of manufac-
turing and service work, the effect of large 
inflows of remittances, which accounted for 
66 percent of foreign currency earnings for 
El Salvador in 2000, and more than a decade 
of civil war that forced thousands of people 
off rural lands.
The Seed Has Been Planted
To be sure, environmental democracy in 
Latin America is only in its infancy. The turn-
ing point, however, seems to be now. Latin 
America is entering what Timothy O’Riordan, 
the well-known American environmental 
philosopher, saw as the third phase in the 
evolution of environmental politics. At this 
stage, the distribution and use of political 
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